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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to present an overview of the main themes and concepts 
cultivated in the intersection between phenomenology and feminism, as well as to introduce 
some of the authors whose research has impacted the field. To that effect, I first analyze the 
seminal works which helped consolidate the discipline that would come to be known as 
“feminist phenomenology”, focusing next on relevant notions to the topic at hand, such as the 
concepts of lived body and facticity. In doing so, I intend to show that, even though 
phenomenology itself may have been charged with engendering essentialist arguments, the 
possibility of further non-essentialist unfolding within a phenomenological framework can 
contribute a great deal to the solution to a number of laborious, yet central deadlocks currently 
plaguing feminism as a theory as much as a political movement. 
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RESUMO: O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma visão geral dos principais temas e 
conceitos cultivados na intersecção entre a fenomenologia e o feminismo, bem como apresentar 
alguns dos autores cujas pesquisas têm impactado a área. Para tanto, analiso primeiramente as 
obras seminais que ajudaram a consolidar a disciplina que viria a ser conhecida como 
“fenomenologia feminista”, focalizando a seguir noções relevantes para o tema em questão, 
como os conceitos de corpo vivido e facticidade. Ao fazê-lo, pretendo mostrar que, embora a 
própria fenomenologia possa ter sido encarregada de engendrar argumentos essencialistas, a 
possibilidade de mais desdobramentos não-essencialistas dentro de uma estrutura 
fenomenológica pode contribuir muito para a solução de uma série de laboriosos impasses, 
embora centrais, que atualmente atormentam o feminismo tanto como teoria quanto como 
movimento político.   





 The connection between phenomenology and feminism is the object of a relatively 
recent and, if we take into account its sheer potential, a hitherto barely explored field of 
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philosophical study. Indeed, many of the now “classic” authors associated with phenomenology 
–including Hannah Arendt, Simone de Beauvoir, and Edith Stein– have approached woman-
related issues. Even so, and despite the fact that Beauvoir's opus magnum has been in printing 
for over 60 years now (not to mention the more recent contributions to feminist theory penned 
by many other authors whose thought was also shaped by the phenomenological tradition) a 
certain level of resistance persists, nonetheless, when it comes to properly establishing the 
conversation that includes both feminism and phenomenology within the bounds of academic 
philosophy. If nothing else, the reception of Le Deuxième Sexe (The Second Sex) betrays the 
discomfort which accompanies the ongoing influx of feminist criticism right into the heart of 
institutional philosophy; for it is common knowledge at this point, as Margaret Simons (1983) 
and Sara Heinämaa (2003) aptly observe, that Beauvoir's work was read more often than not as 
an essay rather than as a full-blown philosophical work (let alone as an explicitly 
phenomenological work), regardless of the author's pervasive adoption of concepts evidently 
originated in the tradition founded by Edmund Husserl. 
 Beauvoir's case illustrates a state of affairs that is fortunately undergoing transformation 
these days: a number of philosophers, the likes of Iris Marion Young, Luce Irigaray, Judith 
Butler, Linda Alcoff, Sara Heinämaa, Silvia Stoller, Linda Fisher, Dorothea Olkowski, among 
others, either have already developed or are presently developing –some of them since the mid-
1970s, others from the 1990s onwards– works that aim to show what is promising in a dialogue 
between feminism and phenomenology, thus making more evident what each part would have 
to benefit from engaging in it. Here I intend to present a general overview of what I consider to 
be the prominent themes and concepts to be found at the intersection between those two fields 
of inquiry; in addition to that, I will indicate which considerations originated in that intersection 
appeal to me the most. 
With this exposition I expect to indicate, albeit in an introductory fashion, how much it 
means across the board for a traditional field of philosophical inquiry such as phenomenology 
to open itself to critical debates involving other areas of knowledge. It is my belief that 
collaborations such as these provide the very opportunity for us to ascertain, in the most 
straightforward way possible, academic philosophy's ability to speak to ourselves in our own 
time and place – that is, its potential to go beyond the undoubtedly valuable achievements upon 
which the researchers in the history of philosophy have their due claim. I also intend to list my 
reasons for maintaining that the rapport between phenomenology and feminism comes to light 
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influence of both poststructuralism and analytical philosophy. 
 
Definitions, noteworthy forerunners and consolidation of the dialogue 
 
 It is certainly no simple matter to keep track of all the threads comprising the relation 
between phenomenology and feminism. The trouble is due, firstly, to the fact that both 
“phenomenology” and “feminism” can each be as complex a theme as its respective definitions 
can be elusive. Such difficulties are mostly the result of the labels themselves having been used 
and incorporated to disparate discourses and in a variety of ways. Since the time Edmund 
Husserl first conceived of it and devised it into a proper philosophical method, phenomenology 
went through several changes, which were, in turn, effected through appropriations by a large 
number of authors such as Martin Heidegger, Edith Stein, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Simone de 
Beauvoir, among others. Similarly, feminism, whether taken as a political movement or as a 
theoretical endeavor, encompasses multiple interpretive venues. To be sure, in its sheer 
plurality, it even makes room for internal dissent, as more than a few of those venues are 
grounded in assumptions that simply exclude one another. 
Limiting ourselves to a considerably general definition, one can nevertheless agree on 
characterizing phenomenology as a philosophical current concerned with lying out the 
structures and experiences of consciousness through a descriptive method that focuses on 
phenomena such as they are apprehended in the context of subjective experience.2 Feminism, 
in its turn, can be understood as a vast movement –both theory- and activism-wise– which seeks 
to secure women's rights so as to overcome gender inequality. On the theoretical front feminism 
asks, for instance, what is the origin of said inequality and what grounds are there for intending 
to preserve it; it so follows that, in posing questions like these, it contributes a wide range of 
topics in political theory. Hence, as soon as phenomenology and feminism establish a 
connection, multiple issues related to the female experience –so often kept invisible by the 
mainstream philosophical discourse– become available for further inspection; by the same 
token, the range of topics to be tackled by feminism benefits from its own acceptance of larger 
philosophical issues concerning the experience of women as subjects. 
  Alia Al-Saji contributes a decidedly interesting view of how the relationship between 
phenomenology and feminism concretely comes to fruition.3 The author distinguishes between 
 
2I emphasize, however, that my own use of the phenomenological theory and method is basically in alignment 
with the different approaches that have its source in the tradition founded by Husserl. 
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two chief ways through which both fields can be connected: on the one hand we have the 
feminist analysis of phenomenological works; from that type of undertaking, a number of 
conclusions can be drawn; the conclusions take either the form of criticism, and as such they 
are addressed to the limitations those phenomenological works present in what regards women's 
situation and the particular conditions of female experience; or else they take the form of a 
renewed interest in studying the works of “classic” women philosophers associated with 
phenomenology. On the other hand we have the application of the phenomenological method 
(or of part of its conceptual apparatus) to traditional issues and topics in the context of feminist 
studies. In allowing feminist theory to be developed from a properly phenomenological 
perspective, this latter approach facilitates various contributions to feminist philosophy in the 
broad sense of the term. In fact, these two approaches are more likely seen to be carried out 
simultaneously, so that the philosophers who happen to develop their own research endeavors 
in the feminist phenomenological front will venture criticizing the faults in the classics' neglect 
to gender issues; at the same time the very same philosophers will employ the typical 
phenomenological method and concepts in order to advance their own projects within the 
feminist theoretical framework. A few cases to be examined in what follows will help illustrate 
this double approach. 
 As is well known, early authors such as Simone de Beauvoir, Hannah Arendt and Edith 
Stein had already developed their works with an eye to the overlapping between 
phenomenology and themes related to the condition of women; nevertheless, this overlapping 
would not be more extensively studied until the 1990s onward, and it wouldn't be cemented as 
a research topic per se until recently. Part of these later studies involve, precisely, revisiting 
those early women philosopher's writings from a fresh, explicitly “feminist” perspective. Still, 
despite this late occupation of the intersection between the two fields, there are some prior 
significant cases worth mentioning. Outstanding among them is the work by Iris Marion Young 
(2005).4 
 Young's approach is noteworthy, first of all, for its appropriation of both the 
phenomenological and existentialist traditions, by which means the author set out to build 
politically oriented analyses of the how women come to experience their own bodies. The 
philosopher goes on to describe what she refers to as the inhibited intentionality of the female 
 
http://www.rotman.uwo.ca/feminist-phenomenology-race-and-perception-an-interview-with-alia-al-saji/ 
4 There are numerous relevant works to be mentioned here, like the essays by Luce Irigaray (1984), Judith Butler 
(1989) and Sandra Bartky (1975); but Young's work excels in its originality, its use of phenomenology to analyze 
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corporeal lived experience. Due to a number of preconceptions regarding how a woman is 
expected to behave –as well as use and frame her own body, so to speak– such intentionality 
inculcates in us a disposition that has us locked out of our own physical abilities and 
potentialities. It directly affects, for instance, our way about the practice of sports. Young's 
conclusion, which I subscribe in its entirety, is that the imposition upon us of this inhibited 
intentionality is the result of our tendency to experience our own bodies as things, being as such 
constantly judged, analyzed, objectified and put under threat –hence this ascertained difficulty 
in our experiencing all our own possibilities. 
 Concerning the regained attention to a specifically phenomenological reading of classic 
authors, the new wave of studies focusing on the work of Simone de Beauvoir seems to me to 
be of particular interest. To a certain extent, Judith Butler (1986; 1989) was the one author to 
trail-blaze this kind of research, her critical reaction to that existentialist philosopher's thought 
notwithstanding. Other fundamental undertakings in that direction are, for example, the 
writings of Margaret Simons (1983) and Sara Heinämaa (2003), which show that The Second 
Sex can be read as a work of phenomenology and, in that capacity, be understood as a conceptual 
tributary of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty –a affiliation long-neglected by interpreters, 
especially given their propensity to regard Beauvoir's book as a rather philosophically 
undemanding sort of essay. 
 Those initial analytical fronts serve as a springboard for the development of various 
other studies comprising phenomenology and feminism at once. Some significant initiatives, 
such as the Feminist Phenomenology Group, founded in 2000 by professor Silvia Stoller of the 
University of Viena, helped cement the research in the area. Many important publications made 
their debut in this context.5 What is distinctive in the studies that are brought out in this scene 
is that, in a definitive way, they manage to actually introduce “feminist phenomenology” as an 
academic field of research, by coining the expression itself and establishing it as a particular 
area of feminist philosophy. As I have already mentioned, the works recently emerging in the 
field are as much about critically revisiting phenomenology's classics from a feminist 
perspective as they are about applying phenomenology's distinctive methodology and analyses 




5 For example FISHER & EMBREE (2000).; STOLLER (2005); STOLLER, & VETTER (1997); SCHÜES; 
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On what feminism has to offer phenomenology (and vice-versa) 
 
When one starts pondering how can feminism and phenomenology possibly benefit each 
other, a parallel question comes along, namely: why has feminist philosophy been so heavily 
influenced by movements such as poststructuralism and, at least initially, so little influenced by 
the phenomenological studies? After examining this issue, Linda Fisher (2000) concludes that 
some of the features that are particular to phenomenology –or at least to its ordinary 
interpretation– have played a role in its estrangement from feminism; so much so that it even 
prompted many authors to eventually posit a fundamental incompatibility between the two. To 
be fair, early contact with phenomenology's seminal writings may indeed make it seem like a 
quite abstract, essentialist philosophy, arguably unfit for the kind of analytical work especially 
focused on gender issues. 
Fisher's remarks make a lot of sense if we take into account certain aspects of 
phenomenology as a discipline. Firstly, if we pay attention to the way Husserl (1976, 34) 
introduces the phenomenological method (viz. as a means to investigate and describe 
phenomena by grounding the whole inquiry on the pure transcendental ego, and that much in 
order to get access to the realm of essences), it becomes sufficiently clear what kind of 
difficulties feminism will find right there. The subject in Husserl's philosophy is a 
transcendental one; it is, therefore, a “self” that will do without gender anyway you look at it. 
Unsurprisingly enough, as far as this Husserlian characterization is concerned, phenomenology 
has been deemed a discipline that remained tied to the paradigm of modernity due to its placing 
a high value on the very notion of subjectivity while at the same time keeping subjectivity itself 
insulated from each and every difference that may be ascribed to the sexes. Now, it so happens 
that many of the charges brought up by feminist philosophy against the philosophical tradition 
boil down to precisely those two points: tradition's essentialist view of subjectivity and its 
alleged “neutrality”, which in fact did a great job of precluding any inquiry into issues related 
to gender differences and gender inequality.6 
This state of affairs appears to constitute a hindrance even when we take a look outside 
the confines of Husserl's phenomenology. Other developments within the phenomenological 
thought, including those by authors that criticized Husserl's essentialism, would seem to be no 
less guilty of the charges of overlooking the distinctively male assumptions behind their own 
conceptions. Interesting examples of that are the Heideggerian concept of Dasein, as well as 
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Merleau-Ponty's notion of body. Through the analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world, 
Heidegger (2001) sought to overcome Husserl's concept of subjectivity. His means of 
accomplishing that required that he described what he viewed as the structures of human being's 
concrete experience; Heidegger's account of those structures would construe them as being 
integral parts of an intersubjective reality (2001, §26); however, the German philosopher fails 
to provide any insight into Dasein in its sexual being; he falls short, that is, of describing its 
being as one that has its identity determined by its gender and is so perceived. Similarly, while 
deserving credit for working out a phenomenological account which deals explicitly with the 
body in its sexual dimension, Merleau-Ponty (2001, 180-202) seems to further no particular 
thought on the specificness of gender in that connection as well.7 
These are some of the points of disagreement which prompted the accrued feminist 
criticism directed at the phenomenological tradition; they constitute some of the chief 
contributions to phenomenology made from the feminists' standpoint. In that sense, it is due to 
the very disagreement between both areas that feminism is able to deliver its first results here: 
in criticizing that which is deemed a limitation in the traditional phenomenological approach, 
feminist theory shows how to expand the scope of phenomenological investigations. This can 
be especially interesting if we focus on the fact that we can look at this feminist contribution 
not only as criticism that has its origin in a very specific political viewpoint, but as a set of 
objections that affect certain basic philosophical constituents: if, at the outset, the 
methodological foundation of the phenomenological tradition expresses the need for describing 
experiences so as to overcome the philosophical tradition's theoretical preconceptions, it is only 
fair to add to its descriptions those elements that refer to gender-related experiences –which 
have been, for ideological reasons, ignored and neglected by philosophy as a whole. In other 
words, tackling gender and sexuality issues wouldn't seem to be a superfluous addition to 
phenomenology's scope; instead, doing so it would be a sign of its own coherence. 
 Regarding whatever potential contributions phenomenology has to offer feminism, I 
would like to mention a few that seem to me to bear great significance; they involve carrying 
out a task only partly finished to this day, namely, the revaluing of questions grounded in the 
concrete and factic (to employ openly phenomenological terms) female experience; an account 
of that kind should include the female corporeal lived experience, comprehended as one of the 
determining conditions of the female identity. That is, I believe it to be of the utmost importance 
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for us to lay new claim to some questions that were left aside (mostly due to the influence of 
poststructuralist thought, or by what came to be often called postmodern philosophy) both by 
feminist philosophy and by feminist theory in general. 
Under the surface of this debate lies, at least in part, the criticism addressed to an 
essentialist view of female subjectivity and, more broadly still, the problem of how to identify 
who can be representative of the political category “woman”, all while keeping these people 
(insofar as they are representative) from being committed, in their subjectivity, to a 
metaphysical straightjacket of sorts. In order to comprehend this topic, if only in outline, we 
have to briefly review the key arguments in a feminist critique of essentialism. In doing so, I 
intend to show that, even though phenomenology itself may have been charged with 
engendering essentialist arguments, the possibility of further non-essentialist unfolding within 
a phenomenological framework can contribute a great deal to the solution to a number of 
laborious, yet central deadlocks currently plaguing feminism as a theory as much as a political 
movement. 
 
An example of feminist phenomenological analysis: overcoming deadlocks by way of factic 
experience and the body 
 
 In short, the issue I refer to as being one of the most difficult conundrums in 
contemporary feminism is that of how one can overcome the essentialist view on what it is like 
to be a woman and who women are, simultaneously taking care, while doing so, not to 
completely impair the possibility of feminism as a political movement, since political 
organizations, in order to advance their claims, construe the basis for their own activism in 
terms of a politics of identity. The aforementioned deadlock can be distinctively made out as 
soon as one peers into the following concrete case. 
 Most feminists tend to adhere to Beauvoir's existentialist maxim that denies the idea of 
a given female essence; however, at the same time, the action many among them are taking to 
improve women's conditions is based on identity-oriented strategies. Every time we gather on 
the streets with our placards up, demanding that violence against women be put an end to, or 
whenever we ask for a new birth control bill to be passed that will give us the choice whether 
or not to stop pregnancy, we are doing so under the assumption that indeed, there are women. 
We are women. Now, a closer look into the consequences of those claims will make clear that 
the theorists influenced by phenomenological thought have played a crucial role in shaping the 
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 To review it briefly, let us begin by taking the “essentialist” view of the feminine as a 
component part, present across all iterations of Western and Christian metaphysics; it will be 
found in some instances of feminist theory as well and, according to some interpretations, 
generally in the feminist movement itself up until the 1960s; the movement at the time adhered 
to a rather fixed, generic category of “woman”, failing to satisfactorily work its way through 
the female experiential diversity. The “anti-essentialist” reaction, as we may call it, is 
introduced as a critical response to the stance that would eventually make a strict ruling on what 
a woman is –and, consequently, also on what she must be: a stance that would, by the same 
token, eventually take the otherness within the subjects identified as women and make it 
invisible. 
 It should be noted, therefore, that this brand of essentialism is itself a wide-ranging 
affair: it encompasses a variety of explicitly masculinist metaphysical propositions, while 
arguably being fostered at the very core of the feminist movement. As evidence of the former, 
numerous propositions by male philosophers from all eras can be adduced: from the 
Pythagorean claim that the woman, like darkness and chaos, came to be by an evil principle (as 
opposed to the good principle by which man was created8) to Rousseau's argument (1979) for 
educating women so that they could better serve under men, to Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's 
statements (1966; 1970) on the lying, deceiving nature of the female of the human species. 
 As to the essentialism rooted within feminism, the issue can prove to be even more 
complex, since its source is not patriarchal like the one permeating the history of philosophy, 
but an affirmative response by women willing to put an end to gender inequality: with a view 
to overcoming the masculinist conception of the feminine, there are even feminists openly 
making the case for the existence of positive characteristics inherent to women only –essential 
qualities which should, as they claim, be valued rather than deprecated. Such is the case of 
certain authors associated with eco-feminism; they maintain that there is an essence that is 
particular to women, which, along with a connectedness to nature, we should learn to cultivate 
anew. Some of these authors will go as far as advocating a “female superiority”, always attached 
to whatever is taken to be the distinctively female features –empathy and an inclination to care 
for others, for instance.9 Criticism addressed to the eco-feminists, on the other hand, makes the 
point whether and to what extent ascribing women certain essential characteristics –positive as 
they may seem to be– would not instead amount to replicating stereotypes the same way 
 
8 As cited by Beauvoir in her epigraph to The Second Sex (2014).  
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patriarchal discourse has always done, thus binding women a bit further down to preconceived 
patterns of action and behavior. 10 
 Furthermore, even the feminists that will not subscribe to an essentialist theory are liable 
to end up building, if unknowingly, an essentialism-laden basis for their own activism. That 
was the charge laid by a number of theorists and activists against the feminist movement as is 
stood by the middle of the 1960s; such is, moreover, the criticism addressed to much of the 
contemporary activism up to this day. Although it might not be openly admitted, oftentimes the 
women who take on a leading part in advancing the feminist cause happen to be focused on a 
specific agenda and a very particular view of “woman”. The rather abstract discourse that only 
refers to “women” without further qualifying the term would appear to eventually standardize 
and essentialize a multiplicity of highly diverse experiences, on the one hand and, on the other, 
universalize the idea of woman based on a very particular experience of “femalehood” – 
typically that of the white, middle-class, straight woman. 
 Even though that which is usually called feminist anti-essentialism branches out in 
multiple directions, I believe it makes sense to distinguish between two fronts or moments 
across the various turning points within feminism. Firstly, resulting from a confluence of 
activism and debates in political theory, there is a response made possible by black, latino, 
lesbian and otherwise marginalized women from a variety of backgrounds. Especially from the 
late 1960s onwards, they drew attention to the question: to what extent a feminist movement 
built merely upon the problematic, rather vague idea of “woman” can actually meet our 
experiences down to their specifics? In that connection, feminist authors such as bell hooks, 
Audre Lorde, Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa can be mentioned, among others. 
 What I designate as the anti-essentialist critique's second moment is related as well to 
the previously listed objections; but it can be mostly traced back to the theoretical work of 
authors who have been influenced by both poststructuralism and phenomenology itself: Joan 
Scott, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler are all associated with that particular 
branch. What these authors show is that not even the conceptions of body and sex can be 
ultimately deemed neutral ones; for that reason, not only gender, but the very idea of body must 
be comprehended as a socio-historical construction. 
 According to Butler (1990, 12): “‘the body’ is itself a construction (...). Bodies cannot 
be said to have a signifiable existence prior to the mark of their gender”. That is, it is not the 
case that we can determine an essence or a foundation to being a woman, not even biologically, 
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because our conception of the body is –as are, from a phenomenological perspective, our 
conceptions of everything else– already laden with our assumptions concerning how our bodies 
are built, how they should be like, and what they are for. 
 This view, as fit as it may be for the job of exposing troublesome essentialist premises, 
has entailed the predicaments I indicated above. Given that flaw, other philosophers and 
feminist theorists, some of them influenced by phenomenology as well, draw attention to the 
effects of radicalizing the arguments presented; according to these authors, the whole discussion 
is all but trapped into a strictly linguistic framework by means of this radicalization. Now, while 
also clearly manifested discursively, violence against women is a quite concrete matter, branded 
(in the utmost corporeal sense) onto the ones who suffer it. In addition to that, it may be 
necessary to preserve some fixed grid of reference to the notion of “woman” as a political 
category precisely in order to secure any degree of effectiveness to the feminist movement. 
 The most interesting objections come into circulation chiefly from the 1990s on, with 
some authors advocating a “strategic essentialism” designed to keep up with feminist activism; 
among those, Linda Alcoff, Tania Modleski, Ellen Rooney, Denise Riley and Sheila Jeffreys 
are the most notable proponents. Alcoff, for example, puts it bluntly: what can we demand on 
behalf of women “if ‘women’ do not exist and demands in their name simply reinforce the myth 
that they do? (...) How can we demand legal abortions, adequate child care, or wages based on 
comparable worth without invoking a concept of ‘woman’?” (1988, 420). With that in mind, 
strategic essentialism would be unavoidable in the context of feminist politics: even if we 
acknowledge the sheer diversity in the experiences of the people referred to as women, even if 
we understand the point that there is no such thing as an essence grounding the idea of 
“woman”, still that category would be required by the shared experiences of the oppressed and 
their being acknowledged as such, as well as by their being able to reclaim their rights. 
 It is in reference to this set of issues that I wish to suggest, following Alcoff and other 
philosophers associated with the phenomenological perspective, that a feminist 
phenomenological analysis can keep contributing to the debate to a greater extent than the fair 
share I have here managed to summarize. First of all, I believe a return to the material elements 
of the female experience is imperative. One reason for doing so is that many of the concepts 
that were culled from the phenomenological tradition, such as facticity, lifeworld and body are 
well suited to a philosophical analysis of the female condition; such an analysis should be 
capable of overcoming the apparent obstacles posed before the task of reconciling the retained 
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time, it should avoid the pitfall of essentialist conceptions that posit some sort of female 
“nature”. 
 An initial step toward a better understanding of this proposal is realizing that, although 
our concept of the body implies socially constructed constituents (and, moreover, always takes 
part in a web of historically grounded meanings, which, in turn, are already affected by a 
number of previously established stances on gender and sexuality), certain features pertaining 
to the experience of most people referred to as women will remain unaccounted for if they are 
approached solely in terms of that socially informed view; in contrast, such features can be 
more vividly made out if one reflects upon the female lived experience. If, for instance, it is 
true that most women menstruate and can get pregnant, then this is to be considered a 
fundamental part of their experiencing their own bodies. Likewise (now bringing the analysis 
to a distinctively political ground) if it is the case that in various cultures women are taught to 
be either disgusted or afraid of their own period blood, as well as to think of themselves as 
incomplete for not bearing children, the fact that we are, in that case, facing a major issue should 
be clear enough. It is something to be taken into account when we are dealing with the 
phenomenon of a woman's experiencing her own lived body.11 
Similarly, the concept of facticity12 sheds light on the fact that the multiple female 
experiences –though each experience can be expected to vary immensely from one woman to 
the next– share certain features which are themselves something describable. For instance, 
when women, by sharing their own stories with one another, are able to learn to what extent the 
fear of being sexually assaulted gets to be part of their everyday lived experiences, or how being 
discriminated and denied a say in nearly every matter are forms of abuse lurking both in the 
workplace and at home, those facts belong to their concrete, factic experience; that is, they are 
not points to be merely explained through linguistic analysis, much less are they issues that can 
be put to rest by someone's claiming that women are unstable or essentially this way or that. As 
Laura Downs' article perfectly expresses, beginning by its title: “If ‘Woman’ Is Just an Empty 
Category, Then Why Am I Afraid to Walk Alone at Night?”.(1993). 
Of course, simply posing this kind of question cannot be tantamount to claiming that 
there is a female essence, neither does it mean that all people referred to as women are the same; 
it only means that, since we share certain characteristics, and since those characteristics are 
construed and represented in similar ways in a given culture –or else in different cultures that 
 
11This is not the place for a detailed treatment of such specialized phenomenological issues. For more on the topic, 
I refer the reader to the work of James Dodd (2012). 
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happen to share similar values– we can, because of that, describe the common features found 
in our own lived experiences and take notice of their intersubjective aspects. This is, after all, 
the process that will ultimately shape our political action. Acknowledging the existence of 
pervasive structures of oppression that engulf a larger number of individuals despite their 
differences is the first step in the tasks of organizing ourselves and changing that context. 
 Accordingly, what the phenomenological alternative shows is that focusing our analyses 
either on differences or similarities is a descriptive choice which, in any case, remains open to 
us. Still, ignoring the concrete aspects manifested in the lived experience of most women (as 
instantiated by certain characteristics which are customarily symbolized and experienced by 
them) is no reasonable solution. This latter claim can be adequately assessed in its full 
significance if we only recall, as I have pointed earlier, the fact that feminist theory, to this day, 
is given a distinctive poststructuralist emphasis, which frequently causes it to view the relevant 
phenomena under an excessively linguistic and discursive light –thereby making it prone to 
forget that, beyond the landmarks of language and discourse, women's experience is also a 




 In this short presentation of the potential connections between phenomenology and 
feminism I hope to have shown, if only in outline, that both phenomenological analysis and 
feminist theory are, to a considerable extent, already engaged in continued mutual contribution, 
despite the strong resistance that can still be felt on both sides. In any case, collaboration with 
a different area will surely depend on an attitude of critical openness and a disposition to 
implement change in our traditional ways of handling discourse and analysis. On the 
phenomenological side of things, it is due time to accept the limitations in the works of 
traditional authors such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who have failed to recognize 
how gender roles can be crucial when it comes to understanding subjectivity. As to feminist 
theory, I have suggested that the excessive postmodern and poststructuralist emphases of late 
must be reconsidered insofar as it has led us thus far into theoretical and political deadlocks 
which could have been otherwise overridden –by means, that is, of a certain kind of analytic 
enterprise, capable of taking into account the factic and concrete aspects belonging to the female 
experience, especially with regard to the body. 
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phenomenology and feminism is that, through them, one might be able to find a fresher form 
of looking into the relevant issues that are already ordinarily examined by feminist philosophy 
in general. The quite reasonable disposition to view philosophical tradition as primarily male 
and patriarchal can be thus reevaluated and re-purposed in the light of renewed interpretations 
and perspectives. Furthermore, the rapport between feminism and phenomenology not only 
helps us in the task of remaking the case for reading and ascertaining value to key authors such 
as Edith Stein, Simone de Beauvoir and Hannah Arendt; it also inspires us to delve into as of 
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